A variation of the Rothschild-Stiglitz' equilibrium is examined in the context of competitive lending under adverse selection. The predictions of the model are tested in an experimental market setting. If equilibrium exists, it predicts that the loan contracts offered and taken separate the projects being financed by quality. When equilibrium exists, the experiments confirm the theory.
as the lenders offer the terms of the contracts, not the borrowers. Our experimental markets are closer to the theory, and therefore, simpler. Goswami et al. (2002) 
Description of the Model
This section first revisits the RS model of adverse selection in a lending context. Next, the single contract constraint in the RS model is relaxed by allowing lenders to offer multiple contracts and the equilibrium in menus of contracts is introduced. The section then links Pareto-optimal provision of contracts with existence of equilibrium in menus of contracts. It should be noted that Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) discusses the possibility of allowing firms to offer multiple contracts but without providing a formal equilibrium definition. A solution to the problem of optimal provision of contracts is also provided in that article. As most of it is adapted from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , the current section is rather brief and the interested reader is referred to the original article for more details.
The economy in this model is populated by entrepreneurs and lenders. Each entrepreneur has access to a project that requires initial outlay of I. The outcome of the project can be either good or bad with corresponding payoffs of X g and X b , X g > X b ≥ 0.
Entrepreneurs are of two types. Those of the high-risk type lead their project to a bad outcome with probability p h , while this probability is equal to p l for the low-risk type, where p h > p l .
5 All entrepreneurs are risk averse with preferences represented by the utility function U (x) (U (x) > 0, U (x) < 0), and all have initial endowment of W .
total nonnegative expected profit.
In addition to being unrealistic, the RS' restriction on lenders to offer single contracts obscures the intuition behind equilibrium non-existence. With the restriction relaxed, the equilibrium in menus of contract does not exist exactly when the zero-profit contracts identified by RS as the only possible candidate for equilibrium do not provide a Pareto-optimal allocation. Thus, with menus of contracts, the tension between competition and optimality is what causes equilibrium to fail to exist. On the one hand competition requires that the expected profits for each of the candidates for equilibrium contracts be zero.
On the other hand, if no pair of zero-profit contracts provides an optimal allocation, competition implies that a cross-subsidized pair of Pareto-dominating contracts will be offered. In each such pair, the contract designed for the high-risk agents loses money (in expectation) while the one for the low-risk agents makes positive expected profit with an overall non-negative expected profit from the two contracts. 8 Because it violates the zero-profit requirement on the individual contracts, such a menu itself cannot be part of an equilibrium. This tension between equilibrium and Pareto-improving contracts is what keeps markets from equilibrating.
The parametrization of the model used in the experimental design is presented next.
7 An allocation of contracts between the lenders and the entrepreneurs is (constrained) Pareto-optimal if a benevolent central planner who possesses the same information as the lenders cannot allocate contracts between the lenders and the entrepreneurs in a way that would make everybody weakly better off and at least one agent (a lender or an entrepreneur) strictly better off. 8 In the real world, cross-subsidized pairs may survive only because of entry restrictions. For instance, exclusive group health insurance provision to employees of a firm often entails a cross-subsidization of the more healthy to the less healthy employees without third parties being able to undercut (because they do not have access to the employees).
Parametrization Used for the Experimental Design
The RS candidate for equilibrium (in single contracts) pair consists of the contract (α h * , β h * ) = (100, 78), designed for the high-risk entrepreneurs, and (α l * , β l * ) = (23, 13) for the low-risk ones.
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For the values of the parameter λ used in the experimental design, and when S = R 2 , the equilibrium in single contracts under the above parametrization exists but is not (constrained) Pareto-optimal. 11 The equilibrium in menus of contracts does not exist.
Two treatments, called Baseline and Non-existence, are created using the above parametrization. In the Baseline environment the contract space is discretized in such a way, so that the RS' equilibriumin-single-contracts pair is included while all pairs that Pareto-dominate it are not. The resulting set 9 Affine transformations of U (x) are used in the tabulation of the payoffs in actual experiments. U h(l) (x) denotes the function for the high-risk (low-risk) entrepreneurs. U l (x) = 20U (x) − 522, while U h (x) = 10U (x) − 121. 10 The derivation of those contracts is not included for the sake of brevity. The contract (α h * , β h * ) for the high-risk entrepreneurs is derived by a simple constrained maximization of U h (α, β) subject to the zero-profit condition U L (α, β, h) = 0. The contract (α l * , β l * ) for the low-risk entrepreneurs is then the only contract that satisfies both the zero-profit condition U L (α, β, l) = 0 and the incentive compatibility condition U h (α, β) = U h (α h * , β h * ). 11 For example if λ = 6/11 the zero-profit optimal pair of contracts is (α l , β l ) = (40.05, 25.39) (the contract intended for low-risk entrepreneurs), and (α h , β h ) = (100, 75) (the contract for high-risk entrepreneurs). This is a cross-subsidized pair of contracts: (α h , β h ) brings a strictly positive profit to the lenders, with exactly offsetting loss from (α l , β l ).
of contracts is denoted S . Thus, in the Baseline environment, the equilibrium in menus of contracts exists and is Pareto-optimal with respect to S . The discretization of the contract space creates a second possible RS equilibrium contract for the high-risk entrepreneurs, namely (α h * , β h * ) = (95, 74).
In the Non-existence environment, the contract space S is altered in a way to include pairs of contracts that Pareto-dominate the equilibrium-in-single-contracts pair. The newly chosen set of contracts is denoted S . The existence of Pareto-improving contracts is what precludes markets from attaining the equilibrium in menus of contracts. Thus, in the second environment, the equilibrium in single contracts exists but there are pairs of contracts that Pareto-dominate it, and, as a result, the equilibrium in menus of contracts does not exist.
Experimental Design

The Laboratory Markets
Each experimental market session consisted of 10 to 14 identical trading periods, each with length from three to ten minutes. 12 Most Baseline session consisted of 10 trading periods. 13 The number of trading periods was increased to 14 in the Non-existence sessions.
14
The contracts, defined as (α, β), were called "financial instruments," or "securities." In the Baseline environment, the possible contracts were given by 16, 20, 23, 26, 34, 44, 55, 65, 75, 85, 95, 100, 105, 110} = (α , 7, 10, 13, 14, 17, 23, 29, 35, 41, 53, 56, 59, 62, 71, 74, 77, 78, 79, 81, 84, 87, 93} = (β 
The following values were used in the Non-existence environment α ∈ {16, 20, 23, 26, 34, 35.6, 40.05, 44, 55, 65, 75, 85, 95, 100, 105, 110} = (α , 10, 13, 14, 17, 22.3, 23, 25.39, 29, 35, 41, 53, 56, 59, 62, 71, 74, 75.16, 75.95, 76.65, 78, 79, 81, 84 
In the Baseline environment, there were fifteen "markets," α 1 , ..., α 15 , called markets "A," "B," "C,"
..., and "O" in the actual experiments. The contracts within each of the fifteen markets were determined by the "prices," β 1 , ..., β 23 , called simply "price 1," "price 2," ..., "price 23" in the experiments. The contacts in the Non-existence environment were defined in a similar way. The markets were called "A," "B," ..., and "P ," and the prices went from 1 to 25. The entrepreneurs in the experiments were called "buyers," while the lenders were "sellers." Each buyer could be of one of the two possible types-Red or Blue, corresponding to the high-risk and the low-risk entrepreneurs. Whether a participant in any given experimental session was a buyer or a seller was determined randomly in the beginning of the session. The type of a given buyer could change from period to period but the proportion of Red buyers, λ, was constant throughout the periods.
For the RS equilibrium in single contracts to exist, λ has to be greater than 0.47. The theory predicts that as long as λ satisfies this restriction, the contracts (α h * , β h * ), and (α l * , β l * ) should emerge in equilibrium. Different values of lambda that satisfy the restriction were used in the Baseline treatment.
This design feature is easily accommodated by the econometric analysis and provides a robustness check for the empirical results.
In the Non-existence treatment, on the other hand, whether on not a given pair of contracts Paretodominates the pair (α h * , β h * ), and (α l * , β l * ) depends on the value of λ. For that reason the value of λ was fixed for all sessions.
Each lender was allowed to offer any number of contracts from those available. The entrepreneurs, on the other hand, could accept at most one contract per period. Moreover, the entrepreneurs could not send offers to the market, they could only accept existing lenders' offers.
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15 The contracts in the Baseline (Non-existence) treatment were presented to the subjects in a 15 × 23 (16 × 25) (α, β)
table. The inclusion of loan amounts and credit spreads that are part of Pareto-dominating pairs in the Non-existence treatment necessarily increases the size of the contract space. Given the visual presentation, however, the difference in contract space sizes between treatments is small enough that the possibility of it causing difference in complexity can easily be excluded. 16 The instructions for the Baseline environment can be found in the end of the paper.
Certainty Equivalent Payoffs
Because of the difficulty of measuring and controlling risk attitudes of human subjects, we substituted leverage-dependent payoff schedules for uncertainty in the final payoffs of the projects. That is, rather than assuming that human subjects make decisions under uncertainty based on a specific expected-utility function with common parameters, we gave them payoffs that corresponded to the expected utility they would have gotten from each of the contracts had they really had the hypothesized risk attitudes. Thus, after obtaining a contract (α, β) a subject in the role of an entrepreneur of type i, i = h, l, did not face any uncertainty but instead earned U i (α, β). Similarly, after providing a contract (α, β) to an entrepreneur of type i, i = h, l, a subject in the role of a lender received a payoff of U L (α, β, i).
Each buyer was presented with a payoff Figure 3 for the payoff table presented to the sellers).
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All payoffs were expressed in a fictitious currency called francs. Each participant's total franc earnings from an experimental session was equal to the cumulative earnings from all periods. In the end of the session the franc earnings were exchanged to dollars at a pre-announced rate. were students enrolled for the 2002 Summer term at UCLA. The summary of the Baseline sessions is presented in Table 1 . Some of the students at the CIT and UCLA sites had had previous experience with experiments in Economics (as they were registered in the experimental databases at their institutions).
For all students at Sofia University it was their first time participating in experiments.
The sessions BCIT1, BCIT2, BSU1, and BSU2 were organized as open outcry markets. The rest were organized as computerized markets. In the manually run sessions, if a seller wanted to send a sell order to the market, she had to raise her ID number, announce the market, the price, as well as the number of units she wanted to offer at this market and price. Buyers could only accept offers. In order to accept an offer, a buyer had to raise his ID number, and announce the market and the price of the offer he wanted to accept. In the manually conducted experiments the book was organized in chronological order. When a buy order came, the contract that was sold first was the one that was offered first.
In the computerized experiments a lender was picked at random when a given contract was offered by more than one lender. 18 The lenders could submit their offers by clicking on any number of the cells of the trading screen (like the one presented in Figure 4 ). Each click sent one offer to the market.
Entrepreneurs could accept any one of the outstanding offers by clicking on the corresponding cell. 19 In the manual experiments a table similar to the trading screen in Figure 4 was drawn or projected on the board and all orders were recorded by the experimenter as soon as they were made in the corresponding cells. Table 2 presents the exchange rates for the seven sessions as well as the average payoffs for the lenders and the entrepreneurs.
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Both the oral and computerized sessions started with the experimenter reading out loud the instructions.
Each session then proceeded with a practice period that lasted 10 minutes for the computerized sessions and 15 minutes for the oral sessions. During the practice period participants could privately ask questions.
After the practice session there was a break in which participants could ask questions in private. The actual periods started only after there were no more questions from the participants.
18 With the time preference rule, at the pilot for the computerized sessions, the subjects always tried to submit orders in the first several seconds of each period causing the web-server to crash. This induced the switching to the random order rule. 19 Instructions and screens for the experiments can be viewed at http://eeps4.caltech.edu/market-020919. Use identification ID:1 and password:a to login as a viewer. As a viewer you will not have a payoff but you will be able to see the trading screen as well as all the forms.
Conjectures
The parametrization of the model described in section 3.1 is used to formulate a number of conjectures, to be tested empirically later on.
The Baseline treatment is designed around the theoretically non-controversial setup where the RS equilibrium in single contracts exists, is Pareto-optimal, and consequently coincides with the equilibrium in menus of contracts. The equilibrium contracts offered and chosen separate the entrepreneurs by risk type; lenders make zero profits on each of those contracts.
The basic predictions from the theoretical model in the Baseline environment are tested in two steps.
The prediction that the contracts offered by the lenders will separate the entrepreneurs by their type leads to the first conjecture.
Conjecture (A)
The entrepreneurs can be separated by their risk type based on the loan contracts they take. High-risk entrepreneurs take bigger loans and bear higher credit spreads than the low-risk entrepreneurs.
Further, the model predicts that from all separating contracts the zero-profit Pareto-optimal ones emerge in equilibrium. The next conjecture concerns this implication.
Conjecture (B)
Lenders make zero expected profits on every contract they offer.
The underlying theory will be confirmed if Conjectures (A) and (B) hold in the Baseline environment.
The Non-existence treatment is designed to investigate the outcome in a competitive environment when the competitive equilibrium does not exist. More specifically, the questions being asked are whether markets stabilize around any particular contracts, whether those contracts provide separation of entrepreneurs by risk type, and finally whether a Pareto-optimal allocation is attained. Two plausible candidates for "stable" menus of contracts are the RS candidate for equilibrium pair and the pair of Pareto-optimal contracts. The following conjecture addresses the possibility that the market settles on one of those alternative pairs.
Conjecture (C)
The entrepreneurs can be separated by their risk type based on the loan contracts they take. High-risk entrepreneurs take bigger loans and bear higher credit spreads than the low-risk entrepreneurs. Moreover, one of (Ca) or (Cb) holds.
(Ca) The contracts traded stabilize around the equilibrium-in-single-contracts pair.
(Cb) The contracts traded stabilize around the Pareto-optimal pair, which involves cross-subsidization.
The emergence of any of the above outcomes would provide a rejection of the Nash conjecture that underlies the notion equilibrium in menus of contracts. Investigating further what forms of beliefs bring about the outcomes in the experiments, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. (Ca) is a theoretical possibility if the lenders hold instead of the Nash conjecture, the Riley conjecture (see Riley (1979a) ).
(Cb) would obtain in equilibrium in menus of contracts if the lenders hold the Wilson conjecture (see Miyazaki (1977) ). A good discussion about the above conjectures is provided in Riley (1979b).
The last conjecture addresses the possibility that separation fails altogether.
Conjecture (D)
The contracts traded cannot be used to separate the entrepreneurs by their risk type.
Results
Data
The empirical analysis that follows uses the experimental transactions data. For each transaction there is a record including a time stamp, the ID of the lender, and the ID and the type (high-risk or low-risk)
of the entrepreneur. The subsections below present the experimental results by treatment.
Baseline Environment
There were 945 transactions within the seven Baseline sessions, just below the maximum possible of 971
(which would obtain if each entrepreneur enters into a contract in every trading period). payoff is 89 from the equilibrium contract designed for them, while the lenders get 2 if the contract is indeed undertaken by a low-risk entrepreneur. The high-risk agents have a payoff of 80 from this contract which makes them exactly indifferent between the equilibrium contracts designed for the two types of entrepreneurs. If a high-risk entrepreneur, however, resolves the indifference between the two types of contract in favor of (23, 13), the resulting payoff for the lender is strictly negative. Instead of the equilibrium contract, the two most frequently offered contracts targeting the low-risk entrepreneurs were ones providing slightly lower payoffs to both types of entrepreneurs (thus circumventing the highrisk agents' indifference issue) and small positive profits for the lenders when contracting with low-risk agents. The contract (α, β) = (23, 14), for instance, paid off 76 and 72 to the low-and high-risk agents 22 The transaction histograms for both the Baseline and the Non-existence treatments are presented using the same grid which includes all possible contracts (α, β) used in the two treatments.
correspondingly. The lenders' profit was 12. This finding is discussed in more detail further down in this section.
To formally test conjecture (A), we first test the null hypothesis that the transactions data come from a bivariate (normal) distribution versus the alternative that the data come from a mixture of two bivariate (normal) distributions, i.e.,
vs.
where
The null hypothesis (one-class model) can be rejected in favor of the alternative (two-class model)
at the 95% confidence level (with a p-value of less than 0.001). The above analysis clearly shows that the data is separated into two classes. Moreover, the data is split between the two classes in the right proportions. However, it remains to show that the classes are homogeneous, i.e., one is consisting mainly of transactions with high-risk entrepreneurs while the other of transactions with the low-risk ones. Table 5 shows the cross-tabulation by buyers' types as well as the estimators of the mean parameters for the two classes. 86% of the transactions in Class 1 involve low-risk entrepreneurs, while in Class 2 the contracts with high-risk entrepreneurs constitute 90% of all trades.
The histogram of all contracts between lenders and low-risk entrepreneurs is presented in Figure 5 (d),
while the contracts with high-risk entrepreneurs are presented in Figure 5 (e). Overall, the above results provide strong support for conjecture (A).
23 Since θ = 0 is a boundary case, the statistic in the likelihood ratio test is no longer distributed as chi-square. The distribution of the statistic is presented in Zhu and Zhang (2004) . The mixture model maximum log likelihood estimates are based on the EM algorithm, which is standard for estimating mixture models.
As it usually takes time for the markets to equilibrate, we perform the above analysis on the data from the last three periods of all Baseline sessions. The histogram of all transactions in the last periods is presented in Figure 6 (a). The separation into two classes is evident from this plot of the data. The hypothesis of one class is rejected in favor of the mixture model at p-level of less than 0.001. The contracts falling in each of the two classes are presented in Figure 6 (b) and Figure 6 (c). The 95% confidence interval for the parameter θ is (0.4603, 0.5826), andλ = 0.5581 falls in it (θ = 0.5215). The separation of the entrepreneurs by risk types in the two classes is evident from the results in Table 6 . Lastly, the histogram of trades involving high/low-risk entrepreneurs is presented in Figure 6 (d) and Figure 6 (e).
When only the last three periods are considered, from the 132 contracts in Class 2, 122 were among the two equilibrium contracts designed for the high-risk agents. The equilibrium contract for the low-risk entrepreneurs was traded 17 times in the last three periods. The contract that was traded most often was (α, β) = (34, 23). The results from the the last three periods provide even stronger support for conjecture (A).
Next we turn to testing conjecture (B). Simple inspection of the most frequently traded contracts
shows that the contracts with Red traders were mostly on the "high-risk" zero-profit line (as shown on The mean profit in Class 1 is 35 francs (t-statistic of 29). (Hh 0 ) is also rejected at the 95% level. The mean profit in Class 2 is -19 francs (t-statistic of -8.7). Thus, using all data and assuming that Class 1 consists of trades with low-risk entrepreneurs while Class 2 consists of trades with high-risk entrepreneurs, we find that sellers offer money losing contracts to the high-risk entrepreneurs while the contracts offered to the low-risk ones are with positive profits. 24 At first this result might seem puzzling, especially in the light that no cross-subsidized contracts were available to the lenders to offer. Instead, the results can be explained by the fact that a fair amount of pooling contracts were offered in the initial periods. Whenever a pooling contract was taken by a low-risk entrepreneur, the lenders made big profits while when high-risk entrepreneurs took it, the lenders made more than offsetting losses. Those pooling contracts are roughly equally split into the two classes, and they positively (negatively) impact the mean in Class 1 (Class 2).
Comparing the histograms of trades in all periods and in the last three periods, it is apparent that pooling contracts are no longer offered in the later periods. The zero profit hypothesis is tested next using the data from the last three periods only. As already discussed, the contracts in Class 2 were essentially the two equilibrium contracts. In Class 1, the lenders offered contracts that were slightly more unfavorable to the entrepreneurs in comparison to the equilibrium contract: the mean characteristics of a contract in Class 1 are (α, β) = (29.7, 19.6). When hypotheses (Hl 0 ) is tested against (Hl 1 ), and
(Hh 0 ) is tested against (Hh 1 ), (Hl 0 ) is still rejected in favor of (Hl 1 ). The mean profit in Class 1 is 30
(t-statistic of 14.9). (Hh 0 ) cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level. Thus, the lenders make zero profit on the contracts designed for the high-risk entrepreneurs but they make strictly positive profits on the contracts designed for the low-risk entrepreneurs. This finding can naturally be attributed to the fact that in equilibrium the high-risk entrepreneurs are indifferent between the contracts designed for them and the contract designed for the low-risk agents. If sellers have any doubts that the high-risk entrepreneurs are going to choose the "right" contract when indifferent, they should offer to the low-risk agents a contract at slightly worse terms as to insure that the high-risk ones do not choose it.
Overall, the results from the Baseline environment provide strong support for conjecture (A). The data from the last three periods provides support for conjecture (B) if one accounts for the possible hedging on the side of lenders against the high-risk entrepreneurs choosing the contract designed for the low-risk entrepreneurs when indifferent between the two contracts. However, in the initial periods sellers do offer pooling contracts and this affects the mean profits of the contracts in both Class 1 and Class 2.
24 If instead of using the separation by classes, we use the actual types of the entrepreneurs (which of course the lenders could not have done), i.e., if we test whether on average the contracts with high-risk agents and the contracts with low-risk agents yield zero profits each for the lenders, we obtain similar results. The mean profit from low-risk entrepreneurs is 36
(t-statistic of 13.4), while the profit from high-risk entrepreneurs is -13 (t-statistic of -7.7).
Also, it is interesting to note that although the average payment in Bulgaria was at least ten times higher in real terms than the average payment in the US, there are no significant differences between the structures of the classes for the two data sets.
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Non-existence Environment
The analysis here mirrors the analysis presented in Section 7.2. There were 1377 trades in all Nonexistence sessions (the maximum possible was 1428). Figure 7 (a) presents the transactions histogram.
As before, the null hypothesis that the data come from a one-class model is tested against the alternative that they are generated by a two-class model. The null is rejected at the 95% confidence 2) while that in the US was (23.5, 13.9). The latter is very close to the equilibrium prediction while the former is a contract that entails profit if undertaken by a low-risk entrepreneur and more than offsetting loss if undertaken by a high-risk entrepreneur. Careful examination of Class 1 contracts in Bulgaria shows that the most frequently traded contracts were the equilibrium contract (23, 13), and (23, 14) and (34, 23), the latter providing slightly worse terms to the entrepreneurs in comparison to (23, 13).
Several pooling contracts of the type described above were offered even in the last periods, however. Because of the small sample size those contracts have an impact on the mean in this class.
reject that separation holds, will wrongly getλ = 0.36. Figures 7 (d) and 7 (e) present the transactions histograms for each of the entrepreneurs' types. The cross-tabulation within the two classes is shown in Table 7 . Of course, given the relative proportions of the two classes, it is not surprising that more than half of the contracts accepted by high-risk entrepreneurs belong to Class 1 instead to Class 2.
Thus, when the data from all periods is used, neither conjecture (Ca) nor (Cb) holds as both of them require separation of trades by types. As a result conjecture (D) is supported.
When the data from the last three periods only is used, the one-class model is rejected in favor of the two-class model with a mixture parameter ofθ = 0.3. The 95% confidence interval for θ does not When performed session by session, the above analysis shows that in three of sessions, namely NUCLA2, NUCLA4, and NCIT, the contracts traded separate the buyers by type. The estimation of the two-class model on the aggregate data from those three sessions results in a mixture parameter estimate of 0.5145. The 95% confidence interval for this parameter is (0.4758, 0.5532), and 9/17 falls in it. Moreover, the cross-tabulation of risk types in the two classes shows that roughly 90% of the classes have the "right" type of entrepreneurs taking the contracts. The results from the test of zero profits reject the zero-profit hypothesis for both classes. The mean profit in Class 1 is 45 francs, while the mean profit in Class 2 is 3.9 francs. In the last three periods the corresponding profits are 35 and 0. These results are very similar to the ones for the Baseline sessions.
In contrast, the rest of the sessions (NUCLA1, NUCLA3, and NUCLA5) fail to exhibit separation by risk types in the two classes of contracts. Cross-subsidized pairs of contracts are temporarily traded in those markets, with the clearest example of that ocurring in session NUCLA3. The history of trades for this session (as shown to the subjects on the "History" screen during the session) is presented in Figure   11 . The contracts of interest are called E6 and N20, and those are offered in period 6. Contract N20 pays 91 to the high-risk entrepreneurs and -11 to the lenders (the low-risk entrepreneurs' payoff is negative).
Contract E6 has a payoff of 78 to the low-risk entrepreneurs, and 34 for the lenders if they transact with low-risk entrepreneurs. The corresponding payoff for the high-risk agents and the lenders are 85 and -41.
Thus, each lender who offers the pair and expects that the proportion of N20 contracts from all accepted contracts is equal to the proportion of high-risk entrepreneurs will make a small positive expected profit.
In the next period instead of N20, one of the lenders "undercuts" and offers E6 and L15, where L15 provides 113 to the high-risk entrepreneurs and -41 to the lenders. This pair of contracts generates a small negative expected payoff for the lenders (of -6). By periods 9 and 10, however, the money-losing contracts are entirely withdrawn from the market and this results in disproportionately more high-risk entrepreneurs taking E6. Of course, if both types take E6, this contract generates negative expected profit. In response to that, a cross-subsidized pair is offered once again in the next period, where E6 is paired with O23. O23 provides 87 to the high-risk entrepreneurs and -7 to the lenders. Following the next two periods, the money-losing contract is once again withdrawn from the market, sending almost all high-risk entrepreneurs to E6. When this happens the lenders offering E6 lose money in expectation. A question that this study leaves unanswered is whether this cycling would continue for many more periods, or if lenders learn and stop dropping the losing contract from their menus. The issue is left for future investigation.
Overall, in those three sessions, out of the 696 contracts traded, 220 were from cross-subsidizing pairs.
However, instead being split roughly 8:9 between contracts intended for low and high-risk entrepreneurs, 177 were contracts that would go to the low-risk agents if the pair were offered (and therefore make positive profits), and only 43 were from the ones intended for the high-risk agents. The latter shows that many sellers offer only the profit-making contract of the pair of cross-subsidized contracts. This, of course, makes sellers who apply cross-subsidization lose money on average, and they quickly withdraw the money-losing contracts from the market.
Thus in the Non-existence session conjecture (Cb) is unambiguously rejected. The markets do not stabilize around any of the Pareto-optimal pairs of contracts. Separation by risk types fails in sessions NUCLA1, NUCLA3, and NUCLA5, providing mixed support for Conjecture D. Conjecture (Ca) also receives mixed support as in the other three of the sessions separation of trades by types is observed.
Implications for Field Econometric Work and Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the competitive provision of loans in markets with adverse selection. The notion of equilibrium used is a simple extension of the RS equilibrium to allow for multiple contracts to be offered by any single lender. Equilibrium in this framework exists if and only if the candidates for RS equilibrium contracts provide a Pareto-optimal allocation.
The model is first tested in a Baseline scenario in which the equilibrium in menus of contracts exists. The results from this treatment illustrate that the contracts traded are clearly separated into two classes, with the high-risk entrepreneurs undertaking bigger loans and bearing higher credit spreads than the low-risk entrepreneurs. Profits are zero for contracts with high-risk entrepreneurs and positive for contracts with low-risk entrepreneurs. Lenders seem be to offering less attractive contracts to the lowrisk clients than equilibrium would predict to prevent the high-risk entrepreneurs from also undertaking them. Overall, the results from the Baseline sessions provide strong support for the theory.
Next, the model is tested in a setup where the equilibrium in menus of contracts does not exist.
In three of those sessions separation occurs and the zero-profit hypothesis cannot be rejected for the contracts offered to the high-risk entrepreneurs. In the other three sessions temporary cross-subsidization is observed but markets never stabilize. The contracts traded in those sessions are still clearly separated into two classes. However, the classes are not homogeneous as separation of contracts by risk types would require. Thus, separation by risk types is rejected only because of the experimenter's knowledge of the types of entrepreneurs undertaking the contracts in each of the two classes. This implies that fitting the standard model to field data may lead to serious biases in estimated parameters while falsely accepting the model's main restriction (separation).
The findings from the Non-existence sessions imply that in competitive framework where the lenders offer the loan terms, the separating contracts studied in the corporate finance literature might not be a robust market outcome. It is left for future research to investigate the market conditions and dynamics leading to each of the possible outcomes. The markets are going to be conducted in 10 to 15 periods. Periods will last around 5 minutes each.
Tables and Figures
You will be told before each period how long this period will be. We will have one practice period before starting the actual ones. The payoff from the practice period WILL NOT be added to your total payoff for the experiment. In each period all fifteen markets are operating. The currency that is used in all markets is called "francs".
Your actions in a given period influence your payoff for that period ONLY. After a period is finished you realize your payoff and a new period is initiated. Your total earnings in the end of the experiment are the sum of your earnings across periods. You can check your earnings at any time by clicking on the link HISTORY on the trading screen.
The participants in the market are divided into two groups: sellers and buyers. Whether you are going to be a seller or a buyer is going to be determined in the beginning of the experiment and it WILL NOT change until the end of it. You can find out whether you are a buyer or a seller by clicking on the "Participate in the Sale" link. The information is in the upper left corner of the screen. The description of the role of each participant in the market follows (we are going to refer to any buyer as "he", and to any seller as "she"):
-Buyers: There are two types of buyers referred to as RED type and BLUE type. In each period there are 9 RED buyers and 8 BLUE buyers, and these numbers do not change across periods. Every buyer will be able to see his type on the announcement board in the bottom of the screen. Please, DO NOT hit the reload button at any time otherwise you will lose important information on the message board.
Buyers can only BUY securities. Each buyer is allowed to buy AT MOST ONE security per period.
(Note: it is not one security from each market -it is ONE security overall!)
A payoff table determines the payoff. There are two different payoff tables, one for the RED type buyers, and one for the BLUE type. You can see links to them on the top of the screen when you click on the "Participate in the Sale" link. You are also given hard copies of those tables. The payoff of each buyer depends on the security bought AND on the price paid, and it is possible to have negative payoffs.
If by the end of a period a buyer has not obtained a security he automatically receives a default payoff equal to 12 francs independently of the type. The total payoff from the experiment for a given buyer is the sum of the payoffs from all periods during the experiment.
A payoff francs independently of the type. The total payoff from the experiment for a given buyer is the sum of the payoffs from all periods during the experiment.
At the end of the experiment, each franc will be converted to dollars. The conversion rate is going to be announced privately to each buyer in the beginning of the experiment. You will be able to find it on the message board in the bottom of your screen. Below are parts of the tables presented to the buyers.
[ Tables Here] For example, if you are a RED type of buyer and you choose to buy security C at price 5, your payoff for the period is going to be 50 francs. If you are a BLUE type of buyer and you choose to buy C at price 5, your payoff is going to be 45 francs. As can be seen from the tables, you can have negative payoff if you trade certain securities at certain prices depending on your type.
-Sellers: Sellers can offer securities to the buyers. Sellers are allowed to offer and sell as many securities as they want. The sellers only know that each period there are 9 RED and 8 BLUE types of buyers in the market. They do not know which of the buyers are RED and which are BLUE.
If a seller does not participate in any transaction during a given period her payoff for that period is 0 francs. However, a seller can increase or possibly decrease her payoff by participating in a transaction.
The payoff from each transaction is determined from a payoff will not know the types of the buyers who participated in transactions with you until the end of the period. Only after the end of the period, the types of the buyers will be revealed and payoffs will be realized.
The total payoff (in francs) from the experiment for a given seller is the sum of the payoffs from all periods during the experiment.
At the end of the experiment your total payoff will be converted to dollars at an exchange rate that is going to be privately announced in the beginning of the experiment. You will be able to find it on the message board in the bottom of your screen.
Important!!! Anybody (buyer or seller) who has negative total earnings for more than two periods in a row will be excluded from further trading and will receive nothing at the end of the experiment.
II. Glossary of important market elements
OFFERS:
Buyers and sellers, open the "Participate in the Sale" web page.
SELLERS:
Each cell on the trading screen has four entries: a/b c/d (all equal to zero in the beginning of each period).
"a" is the number of units you sold at this market and price "b" is the number of units sold by all sellers in this market and price "c" is number of units currently offered by you in this market and price "d" is the total number of units currently offered by all sellers in this market at that price.
If you are a seller and you submit a SELL OFFER for a given security at a given price, this means that you are willing to sell the security to anyone at that price. If no one accepts the offer (how offers are accepted is explained later in the text) it goes unfilled. Your unfilled offer remain on the trading screen until it is cancelled by you, is taken by a buyer, or the period is over.
If you are a seller, you may place sell offers for any number of units. The computer will automatically fill orders if possible. If you want to place an order, you have to click (in order to highlight it) on the cell indicating the market and the price you want to submit order at, and then click on the "submit offer"
button. Each click on the "submit offer" button adds one more unit to the ones that are already offered at the market and the price indicated by the highlighted cell.
If you want to cancel a still unfilled offer, you have to click on the cell where you placed the offer and then click on the "Cancel Offer" button. Each click cancels one of your outstanding offers.
BUYERS:
Each cell on the trading screen consists of two numbers a/b (both equal to zero in the beginning of each period). "a" is the number of units bought by all buyers in this market and price, while "b" is the number of units currently offered in this market and price.
If you are a buyer, you will only be allowed to submit orders at those markets and prices for which there are already offers from the sellers (i.e., you can click on cells with posted offers only). If you attempt to submit a buy order for which there is no counter sell order, your order will be automatically cancelled and no one will see that you placed such an order. You are allowed to accept at most one buy order per period. When you decide which of the offers to accept, you have to click on that offer to highlight it and then hit the "submit order" button. When the order is processed successfully, the market and the price cell is highlighted in red. You will not be able to cancel a once submitted order.
If there is more than one seller who offered a security at a given price, whenever a buy offer comes, one of the sellers is going to be chosen randomly and her security will be the one sold to the buyer.
NOTICE: orders are not executed chronologically. A seller is chosen randomly each time there is more that one seller offering a given security at a given price. Thus, submitting many orders does not improve your chances of being chosen as long as you have at least one outstanding order.
